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INTRODUCTION
No disease invokes fear and panic globally like Ebola Virus 
Disease (previously known as the Ebola Haemorrhagic 
Fever). Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) is a severe febrile 
illness which causes death in 25–90% of all the clinically 
ill, and is caused by the Ebola virus, a member of the 
Filoviridae family. Five species of Ebola virus (Zaire, 
Sudan, Bundibugyo, Reston and Taï Forest) constitute 
the genus Ebola virus. The Bundibugyo, Zaire, and Sudan 
Ebola virus species cause severe EVD outbreaks in humans. 
Fruit bats of the Pteropodidae family are considered to be 
the natural host of the Ebola virus [1]. Epidemics of EVD 
are thought to begin when an individual becomes infected 
through contact with the meat or body fluids of an infected 
animal. Once the patient becomes ill or dies, the virus 
spreads to others who come into direct contact. Person-
to-person transmission occurs through direct contact with 
the blood, body fluids, or skin of patients with EVD, 
including those who have died. Laboratory diagnosis 
is essential to confirm EVD cases [2]. Over the last two 
decades, Ebola virus disease outbreaks have become more 
frequent [3]. The unprecedented 2014 outbreak in Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra that infected over 28,616 people and 
killed over 11,000 [4] disrupted the entire health systems 
and almost resulted in a total economic collapse was a 
stark reminder of the devastation that EVD outbreaks 
can cause. It also emphasized the need for countries to 
take proactive preparedness actions whenever there is an 
outbreak in a neighbouring country.
RISK ASSESSMENT OF EVD SPREAD TO 
SOUTH SUDAN
The risk assessment of EVD spreading from the epicentre 
in Ituri province in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) to South Sudan was jointly done by the Ministry 
of Health (MoH) in DRC with the three levels of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and employed 
the methodology in the WHO guidelines for the risk 
assessment of acute public health events [5]. Based on the 
initial hazard, context and exposure assessments which 
considered the porous border of the two countries, the 
high trade and population movement, the presence of 
refugees and IDPs along the border areas, the weak and 
fragile health systems in the region and the similarities 
in culture, flora and fauna the level of risk was placed 
at ‘high’ (similar to that of neighbouring countries like 
Uganda and Rwanda). On 28th September 2018 the level 
of risk was raised to ‘very high’ [6] as the outbreak in DRC 
evolved and was compounded by insecurity that saw 
interruptions in control measures resulting in a number 
of contacts being missed and new cases being identified 
that were not known contacts.
South Sudan has previously experienced three EVD 
outbreaks in 1976 [7], 1979 [8] and 2004 [9] and all these 
were due to Ebola Sudan species and were not linked to 
cross-border transmission. Therefore, given the presence 
of the reservoirs (fruit eating bats) in the greater Equatoria 
region, it is possible that a sporadic outbreak can happen, 
and so the country is always at risk.
BASELINE ASSESSMENT USING WHO 
CONSOLIDATED PREPAREDNESS CHECKLIST
When the EVD outbreak was declared in the DRC, the 
MoH used the WHO Consolidated EVD Preparedness 
Checklist [10] to establish the status of preparedness at the 
national level as well as to inform the development of a 
comprehensive contingency plan. The assessment also 
took into consideration the gaps identified in the Joint 
External Evaluation (JEE) of the International Health 
Regulation Core capacities in October 2017 [11]. The 
assessment revealed serious gaps in Coordination, Risk 
Communication, Rapid Response teams, Laboratory, 
Case Management and Infection Prevention and Control, 
Safe and Dignified Burial and Logistics. Consequently, 
these thematic areas were earmarked for immediate 
intervention in order to scale up the capacity to respond 
given that the DRC outbreak was spreading.
PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS BY THEMATIC 
AREAS
Leadership and Coordination 
The MoH and WHO fast-tracked the operationalization 
of the first ever Public Health Emergency Operations 
Centre (PHEOC) to act as the central coordinating body 
for the EVD preparedness activities. Given the level of 
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risk of EVD spreading to South Sudan from DRC the 
PHEOC was upgraded from a “Watch Mode” to an “Alert 
mode”, and the National EVD Taskforce (NTF) chaired 
by an Incident Manager and all key Technical working 
groups were activated (Figure 1). State level taskforces 
were activated in the high-risk states of Yei River, 
Gbudue, Torit, Maridi, Tambura and Jubek. The NTF 
guided the development of a contingency plan as well as 
an EVD preparedness operational plan and the updating 
of all the standard operation procedures (SOPs) for all the 
Technical areas of an EVD response. Over 20 Meetings 
of the NTF have so far been conducted, some of which 
have been chaired by the Honourable Minister of Health, 
Dr Riak Gai Gok. Six strategic areas of preparedness 
were identified as shown in Figure 1: The NTF has also 
mobilized donors to pledge towards the USD 11 million 
EVD preparedness operational Plan. These funds will 
be channelled to the different UN agencies and partners 
supporting different technical areas of the preparedness. 
So far over USD 2 million have been received by different 
partners to support the preparedness efforts. 
Access, Security and Safety
The fact that the second wave of EVD cases in Beni, DRC 
has been driven by insecurity and access impediment 
prompted the NTF to focus on access, safety and security. 
High-level engagement in conflict-affected areas with 
armed groups enabled the establishment of screening 
points in parts of Yei River State such as Kaya and Okaba.
Risk Communication and Social Mobilization
Communities’ perception of the risk of EVD as well as 
their acceptance of prevention and control measures 
is vital for any preparedness and control efforts. The 
MoH with support from UNICEF, WHO and other 
partners has rolled out different risk communication 
and community engagement strategies. High-level 
advocacy visits led by the National Minister of Health 
was made to all the priority states; mass media messaging, 
community meetings and Information, Education and 
Communication (IEC) materials have been updated and 
disseminated. The community has been supportive and 
has been calling the hotline to seek for more information 
or to report suspected cases or deaths. This needs to be 
sustained through continuous engagement and regular, 
accurate communication.
Epidemiology, Surveillance and Laboratory
• An Alert desk was created at the National Public Health 
Emergency Operations Centre with a toll-free hotline; 
this has received over 1200 calls of which three have been 
suspected Ebola cases - that were investigated and tested 
negative. 
• To improve case detection and investigations, standard 
case definitions have been distributed across the country 
and Rapid Response teams are undergoing training and 
receiving mentorship from experts (WHO, Centers for 
Disease Control and other partners) on case investigation 
and contact tracing. 
• At the National Public Health Laboratory over 20 
laboratory personnel were trained on Biosafety and 
Biosecurity for management of infectious samples as well 
as EVD molecular testing using Genxpert Technology. 
This enabled the country to conduct its first in-country 
EVD Diagnostic test in October [12].
Points of Entry
• Over 39 Points of Entry have been mapped for 
establishing screening points, of which 14 have been 
prioritized in the high-risk states of Yei River, Gbudue, 
Tambura, and Torit - all these are currently operational. 
The Juba International Airport screening point has 
been upgraded to meet the requirements under the 
International Health Regulations 2005; Nimule ground 
crossing screening, which is the busiest in the country 
with over 4,000 travellers per day, is also being upgraded. 
Over 300,000 travellers have been screened in all 14 sites 
with 13 alert cases picked but none met suspected case 
definitions. 
CASE MANAGEMENT AND INFECTION 
PREVENTION AND CONTROL
• Prompt isolation of suspected Ebola cases and the early 
Figure 1: Organogram of the National Task Force (NTF)
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initiation of support treatment is a Key Pillar of Ebola 
response that reduces EVD transmission and increases 
the chances of survival for those infected. Using the 
WHO Consolidated EVD preparedness checklists, the 
MoH noted that there were no isolation facilities in the 
country and the level of infection prevention and control 
in most health facilities was sub-optimal.  The amount of 
information given to health care workers increases their 
understanding of EVD and their engagement in training 
[13]. Therefore the MoH conducted orientation sessions 
to frontline healthcare workers in the early phases of 
the DRC outbreak, and training in 10 priority sites on 
comprehensive case management and infection prevention 
between October and November 2017.
• Construction of 10 isolation sites in Jubek, Yei River, 
Gbudue, Torit and Tambura states has been prioritized 
by the National taskforce with support from the donors.
• Safe and dignified burial teams were identified in Juba, 
Yei and Yambio and are undergoing training.
Vaccines and Therapeutics    
The latest tool for the control of an EVD outbreak is the 
recombinant vascular stomatitis virus (rVSV) vaccine 
against Ebola Zaire (ZEBOV). This vaccine, although 
not yet licensed, has been reported to be safe with high 
efficacy [14]. It is being used in DRC for the response, and 
in Uganda among the frontline health workers as a risk 
mitigation. The Vaccine and Therapeutics working group 
has initiated the process of obtaining ethical clearance 
for the compassionate use of the vaccine among frontline 
health workers. Once this is obtained, WHO and other 
partners will support the vaccination of health workers as 
per the approved protocol.  
CONCLUSION
South Sudan will remain at risk of EVD outbreaks for the 
foreseeable future. Therefore, it is important that relevant 
capacity to detect, investigate, respond and contain 
any outbreak at source is developed as required under 
International Health Regulations (2005). The country has 
not yet attained operational readiness, however significant 
progress has been made by the MoH and partners. Given 
the history and context of the Health System in South 
Sudan there is a need for more support to ensure that 
the required level of readiness for any EVD outbreak is 
attained. 
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